Beyond Terror and Militants: Assessing Conflict Risk in Nigeria

May - October 2012
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Not every explosion in northern Nigeria stems from the radicalism of Boko Haram. Nor is every outbreak of violence in the Niger Delta the result of militants fighting over oil revenues. Rather, violence in its different forms is an expression of a broader and deeper fabric of social, economic, political, and security challenges. Given the wrong set of underlying conditions, collective violence can spark seemingly out of nowhere, whether or not there is a formal paramilitary group active in the region. Even when such organizations do not exist, in an area with past and current episodes of insecurity, latent structures may still be there, to be crystallized at a moment’s notice—in the event of a political contest, land dispute, turf warfare, or chieftaincy tussle. Violence can sometimes be self-organizing. Just add water.

The government’s amnesty program in the Niger Delta has been partially successful. Attacks by militants on oil facilities and state assets have been much reduced. However, since 2009, organized insurgency in the Niger Delta has morphed into a situation of general lawlessness — abductions, murders, gang violence, intra-communal violence, land disputes, mob justice, and political thuggery. Meanwhile, in the North, ethnic and sectarian violence has polarized communities causing some to migrate into religious enclaves out of fear. During the period of May-October 2012, there were bombings in Kaduna and large scale communal violence in Plateau. In addition to the shifting patterns of violence in the North and the South, there were also devastating floods — Nigeria’s worst in 40 years — which further exacerbated pressure on the state’s ability to manage conflict risk.

Although conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta are distinct from those in the North, each needs to be seen in the national context. By all accounts, the elections in 2015 could have enormous implications for sustainable human security country-wide, and the question of whether incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan will decide to run again comes up frequently in conversations with civil society representatives as they evaluate the risk of conflict escalation over the medium term. The federal government based out of Abuja is in some respects the pivot point on which the seesaw of conflict in Nigeria is balanced. But aside from the systemic, structural conditions, proximate local factors matter a great deal, especially if the goal is to move beyond conflict analysis to early warning and peacbuilding, which the UNLocK project does in fact attempt to do.

During the six-month period of May-October 2012, UNLocK network participants met in both the Niger Delta (Port Harcourt, Rivers State) and in the North (Kaduna) to discuss recent trends in social, economic, and security-related conflict risk factors across the country. This report summarizes the findings from those workshops.

This report does not presume to be comprehensive or evenly distributed from one indicator or location to another. Rather, it provides a glimpse into the concerns and perspectives of a particular network of civil society organizations, trained in conflict assessment, based in Lagos, Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Kaduna, Plateau, Zamfara, and Kano states. Workshops have been held approximately every three months for the last three years in order to keep close track of the conflict environment and promote the peacbuilding work of civil society in Nigeria.

In this report, we have also included quantitative data on violence and conflict generated from the Nigeria Watch dataset to corroborate and add context to the UNLocK data and analysis.
UNLocK Incident Reports May-October 2012

Key Incidents of conflict risk highlighted by the UNLocK participants include those listed in the timeline below.

### May
- **Cross River:** Dozens reportedly killed and thousands displaced as a result of communal violence.
- **Abia:** Traditional ruler of Ugwu Leru community reportedly killed by mob.

### June
- **Kaduna:** Multiple church bombings killed dozens, triggering violent protest and retaliation.
- **Delta:** Security forces reportedly respond to cult (gang) violence around Warri.
- **Plateau:** Ongoing clashes reported between farmers and cattle herders.

### July
- **Ogun:** Several reportedly killed in ethnic violence.
- **Plateau:** Dozens killed, including two lawmakers, when gunmen attacked a burial for victims of communal violence who had been killed previously.

### August
- **Kogi:** 19 worshipers killed by gunmen.
- **Enugu:** Multiple abductions reported
- **Edo:** Gunmen attack prison in prison break.
- **Imo:** Reported abduction of official.
- **Adamawa:** Many displaced by floods.

### September
- **Kaduna:** Widespread flooding.
- **Zamfara:** Ongoing problems of mining-related lead poisoning.
- **Plateau:** University students killed by gunmen.

### October
- **Niger:** Many displaced by floods.
- **Kaduna/Kano:** Peaceful protests of anti-Islamic video.
- **Plateau:** Local civil servants strike over wages.
- **Imo:** A group of kidnappers reportedly arrested.
- **Enugu:** Traditional ruler reportedly abducted.
- **Enugu:** Paramount ruler reportedly murdered.
- **Anambra:** Local government deputy chairman reportedly kidnapped.
- **Abia:** State university temporarily closed due to student protests.
From May 2010 to October 2012, FFP conducted 13 conflict assessment workshops in Nigeria in partnership with The Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL). In September, Human Rights Monitor (HRM) hosted a workshop in Kaduna to introduce UNLocK to civil society representatives from across the North.

In the course of these workshops, civil society representatives based in Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Abia, Lagos, Kaduna, Kano, Zamfara, and Plateau states have been trained in a conflict assessment methodology utilizing FFP’s Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) framework. The CAST framework was then adapted through a consultative and participatory process and tailored to the local conflict landscape and for amenability to the participatory methodology of data collection, resulting in the UNLocK framework with eight indicators. The framework is applied by the network of local civil society representatives to assess, anticipate, and take actions to prevent violent conflict.

Since the UNLocK Nigeria Early Warning System was established in 2010, participants have been submitting incident reports to a password-protected database organized by date, location and indicator. These incident reports are then compiled to generate an image of the conflict landscape in Nigeria that can be used to anticipate and respond to the major pressures which could lead to conflict. Beyond serving as a risk assessment for those who want to avoid areas of potential violence, this information can be used by those in the public, private, and nongovernmental sectors to inform conflict sensitive approaches to development and policy.

The 8 UNLocK indicators for which data is sought include social, economic, and political/military pressures on the state:

**Social and Economic Indicators**
- Demographic Pressures
- Refugees or Displaced Persons
- Group Grievance
- Economic Pressures

**Political and Military Indicators**
- Governance/Legitimacy
- Public Services
- Human Rights
- Insecurity
The quantitative data generated by Nigeria Watch (www.nigeriawatch.org) at the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) corroborates and adds context to the UNLocK data, which highlights areas of concern to civil society in conflict-affected communities. Upon formatting and coding the Nigeria Watch data according to the UNLocK framework, findings suggest that death by natural disasters (especially flooding) spiked in August, particularly in Adamawa state, consistent with the UNLocK timeline. Incidents of violence were most frequent in Borno, where there are no UNLocK participants as yet, followed by Lagos and Kaduna, where there are. This analysis illustrates the value of systematically integrating content analysis data from media sources with participatory methodologies like UNLocK for a fuller picture of the patterns of risk by indicator and location.
This is the sixth summary report for UNLocK Nigeria. This report covers incidents logged during a six-month period (May 1, 2012 – October 31, 2012) by participating civil society organizations. It is organized by state, with maps showing affected states and local government areas. After breaking out the 92 discrete incidents by state and indicator (allowing for a maximum of 3 indicators per incident), there were a total of 164 reports logged during this period.

Of the 8 UNLocK Indicators, based on a tailoring of the CAST framework (see page 3 for a list of the indicators), reports relating to Insecurity were the most prevalent (59 reports), followed by those pertaining to Demographic Pressures (29 reports), followed by those pertaining to Governance/Legitimacy and Group Grievance/Collective Violence (both with 17 reports), followed by Refugees/IDPs (15 reports), followed by Economic Pressures (13 reports), Human Rights (10 reports), and Public Services (4 reports).

Given that in September we introduced the UNLocK project to the northern part of the country for the first time with a workshop in Kaduna, there was an increase in reports from that region (particularly Kaduna and Plateau), whereas in the past the network was almost exclusively focused on the Niger Delta. Still, Rivers State (in the Niger Delta) produced the largest number of reports during this period though reduced from the previous six-month period. Between May and October 2012 there was a much more even distribution of reports across the six geo-political zones. Nevertheless, in the state-by-state summary that follows, there is more focus on Rivers State than the northern states.

While the UNLocK network is a platform for civil society and other stakeholders to collectively assess conflict risk factors, the majority of participants tend to focus organizationally on human and civil rights. This influences the types of reports that they contribute. If the list of organizations were to be primarily focused on economic development (for instance), the tally would likely look somewhat different. The summary that follows, therefore, provides a rich description of the political and socio-economic climate in these areas over the last six-months, as seen by a specific network of civil society representatives, but is by no means definitive.
Cult Violence In Rivers State

On one level, Nigeria’s Amnesty program has been a great success. Since 2009, militant attacks on state assets and oil facilities have declined significantly. Partly due to this trend (as well as global economic factors) oil production is now up. In 2008, an average of 800,000 barrels per day were produced; in 2012, this figure has soared to 2.4 million barrels per day. The Amnesty program was designed to address a narrow problem: militancy against state assets. Unfortunately, the broader problem of human insecurity remains. Abductions, violent crime, mob violence, conflict over land and resources, chieftaincy tussles, political thuggery, abuses by public security forces, and gang violence are major issues for people living in the Niger Delta, issues that the Amnesty program was not designed to address. In fact, as one person told our researcher in Port Harcourt, frankly speaking, “for us, militancy was not the problem.” To the extent that this is true, the Amnesty program was designed to address the government’s problem, but did very little to address the felt needs of the citizens.

As expressed in Focus Groups and Key Informant Interviews, one key driver of human insecurity that needs to be addressed is cult violence, as groups of armed youths terrorize the population despite several initiatives by the government to eradicate them. Cults are gangs whose membership rosters are secret and are bound by oaths. Cults that once stood for the protection and emancipation of the people of the Niger Delta have become among the most feared elements of society.

Historically, cult groups have played an important role, acting as institutions for conflict resolution, settling disputes, and dispensing justice. In Nigeria, cult groups were traditionally formed along ethnic lines comprising elders and adults. With time, and the ever-changing social, political, and economic context, cults became centered around tertiary education institutions. The first modern fraternity cult was the Pyrate Confraternity, also called the National Association of Sea Dogs, and was started by the Nobel Prize winning author Wole Soyinka at the University of Ibadan in 1952. Membership was extended to intellectually outstanding young men, regardless of race or tribe. It behaved almost as a civil society group, promoting social, political, and economic empowerment, aimed at resisting colonialism, bad university policies, and the sexual exploitation of female students by lecturers.

In the 1980s and 1990s, some with political agendas saw an opportunity to leverage university fraternities for their own ends and began supporting them with money and weapons. As the cults’ influence grew they became more violent and predatory. Even the Sea Dogs has reportedly been involved in violence. In 1999, for example, a fight between the Sea Dogs and another group called the Buccaneers resulted in the deaths of three students at the University of Calabar, in Cross River State.

School authorities have been known to mobilize confraternities to eradicate perceived threats to their positions or agendas, exacerbating violence on campus. The tainted relationship between cultist youths and lecturers promotes examination malpractice and other types of corruption in the educational system. Recruits are reportedly lured into confraternities with the promise of money, protection, social status, and sex. Once a person has become a member it is difficult to disengage from the confraternity and members have been killed when attempting to do so. However, despite the money spent on this program, the initiative was not ultimately successful.

In 1999, as part of his anti-cult strategy, President Olusegun Obasanjo launched a campaign to cleanse universities of confraternities and cults. As a result, many universities televised the renunciation of cult members who claimed to have become born-again Christians. However, despite the money spent on this program, the initiative was not ultimately successful.

Nigeria’s universities, once the best in West Africa, have deteriorated. Overcrowding, crumbling infrastructure, and outdated curricula have undermined the functioning of the educational system. Confraternities, previously a symbol of prestige and intellectual excellence, have devolved into cult gangs that terrorize students and professors alike.

From the Campus to the Streets

Confraternity violence peaked in the 1990s, spreading to the streets and creeks through militarized wings and breakaway factions of dropouts. Urban cult godfathers provide members with arms, especially during electioneering for political thuggery. Criminals hire them to administer routes and provide onsite-security for illegal oil bunkering activities. Cult gangs are active within community youth associations as enforcers, to defend the interests of their members, increase their influence and for protection. Businesses have been known to make direct payments to those associated with cult gangs, to ensure the safety of their operations. In addition to extortion and racketeering activities, cultists are used as bouncers in clubs, restaurants, and brothels. In sum, cult gangs are funded through illegal activities such as armed robberies, protection money, dues paid by members, land rights from prostitutes, and payments for hits.

The police are undertrained and frequently ill-equipped to deal with this threat to public security. Corruption also undermines the effectiveness of the response.

Cults have served as a gateway into all kinds of criminality and violence, including militancy. During the height of the insurgency (before 2009), a group called the Icelanders, led by a militant named Ateke Tom, worked with such cult groups as the Deewell, the Vikings, the Malaysians, and the Elegemface. Another militant, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari created the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, which was allied with such cult groups as the Greenlanders, the Deebam, and the Bush Boys. These groups and networks of groups had wide geographical penetration and were heavily armed. But further complicating the structure is the fact that many youth associations at the community level also have “cult groups”, some of which take their names from the larger organizations with whom they may or may not have direct or indirect linkages. So the entanglements and overlap between university confraternities, street gangs, youth groups, and ethno-nationalist militias are not easily unraveled.

Although the Amnesty program did in fact peel off the leaders and incentivize the syndicates to stop attacking state assets, it did little to address issues of criminality, political thuggery, and other forms of violence that these groups are frequently involved in. Furthermore, as the legitimacy of traditional leadership structures has eroded due to their inability to deal with trans-communal issues, cult groups have backed their own candidates to take leadership in the community, further destroying traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. Chieftaincy tussles and other violent intra-communal conflicts have erupted across the Niger Delta.

8. UNHCR, 1999, Nigeria: Activities of an Organization Called the Seadogs (Sea Dogs) (National Association of Seadogs: NAS), also known as the Pyrates Confraternity, http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/docid/3ae6ad6a58.html
12. The Economist, 2008
15. Ozuari, 2006: 11
Cults have brought violence into the streets in turf wars to assert their influence and settle private disputes, resulting in the destruction of property and lives.\(^{17}\)

**Urban Cults in Rivers State**

Urban cult gangs originate from innocuous cultural groupings of young people that usually grew up together or went to the same school. Over time these evolve into street cult gangs dedicated to the protection of their members and territory and providing them with economic opportunities within their community. Members are bound by an oath and keep their identities secret.\(^{18}\) These gangs are prevalent in squatter camps and poor, dense neighborhoods. Urban gangs maintain fluid alliances, merging with confraternity military wings and are often sourced by ethnic militias, politicians, and criminals for specific tasks and activities.

Cultism and the response to cultism frequently leads to escalations in human insecurity. A recent example in Rivers of such a vicious cycle was the October 2012 lynching of four alleged thieves who were reported to be cult gang members. According to some news sources five young men from the University of Port Harcourt went to Aluu village to collect a debt from another student.\(^{19}\) As they were attempting to do so, local villagers apprehended them and accused them of stealing a phone and a laptop. As punishment for the offence a vigilante mob beat them and burned four of them alive.\(^{20}\) In retaliation, students from the university invaded Aluu destroying cars, setting buildings ablaze and looting houses and shops.\(^{21}\) The university was closed for weeks and people left the village of Aluu for fear of further violence, whether by cultists, student protesters, or police.\(^{22}\)

This incident is an example of how the prevalence of cultism and criminality has led to a cycle of vigilantism and security crackdowns, escalating violence in an environment where people have little confidence in the judicial system.\(^{23}\)

**Conclusion**

Cult gangs are a serious problem in Rivers state. Attempts by the government to eradicate cults have in several instances temporarily dampened violence only for it to flare up again more ferociously. The cult gang problem highlights several issues underlying the drivers of human insecurity in the Niger Delta. The infiltration of gangs in local politics and police illustrates the corruption of public institutions in the region. In addition, cult gangs have further exposed gaps in police capacity to deal with these issues.
Communal Tensions in Plateau State

Plateau State is located in the central “Middle Belt” region of Nigeria. Jos, the administrative capital of Plateau, has a population of nearly one million residents. It has historically been an important national administrative, commercial, and tourist center. However, in recent years, violent ethno-sectarian clashes between farmers and cattle herders have plagued the region.

In 2001, violence reportedly claimed as many as 1,000 lives in Jos; more than 700 lives in 2004; and more than 700 in 2008. Hundreds more were reportedly killed in 2010.

During the six-month period of this report, there were several clashes which killed dozens. In one such incident gunmen reportedly attacked a funeral for victims of communal violence who had been killed earlier in the week. Two prominent lawmakers died in that attack.

Aside from the incidents of violence, Plateau also experienced significant demographic pressures as well as challenges relating to governance/legitimacy during this period.

Along with much of the country, Plateau experienced severe flooding, which killed dozens and displaced many. The destruction of bridges and roads made relief aid that much more difficult to deliver.

Additionally in this period, the government was reportedly unable to pay the newly agreed upon minimum wage, resulting in both the Local Government Area staff and public school teachers going on strike throughout the state.

Flooding in Adamawa State

Adamawa, one of Nigeria’s largest states, was formed in 1991. It is located in the northeast of Nigeria and its capital is Yola. While the population’s major occupation is farming, the communities situated on the river banks are fisherman, and the Fulanis are cattle herders.

While the Nigeria Watch dataset listed a number of violent attacks on police, villages, and businesses, some of which were allegedly connected with Boko Haram, the UNLocK participants highlighted the problems of flooding in Adamawa during this period.

Nigeria’s rainy season typically extends from March to mid October with the month of August being moderately dry. However, the heaviest rainfall in the last four decades struck Nigeria this year putting enormous pressure on the Lagdo Dam, on the Cameroonian side of the border. The Lagdo Dam was opened to keep from breaking—to avert a worse catastrophe. But the notice was short and did not give those downstream enough time to escape the torrent as the banks of the river burst, destroying infrastructure, property, farmland and livestock. Despite having long planned to do so, Nigeria has not yet built its own buffer dam, which would have mitigated some of the destruction, according to the Ministry of Water Resources.

This situation highlights the importance of improved town planning, emergency management, and coordination with counterparts on the Cameroonian side of the border.
Sectarian Tension in Kaduna State

Kaduna is located in central northern Nigeria, neighboring eight states. It is rich in minerals such as clay, serpentine, asbestos, amethyst, gold, and graphite. Due to its geographical location, Kaduna is a cultural melting pot with six major ethnic groups and over twenty minority groups. The northern part of the state is predominantly Muslim, while the southern part is predominantly Christian.

In recent months, there have been a series of church bombings as suspected militants have apparently been trying to provoke a cycle of collective violence. Indeed, as reported by UNLocK participants, the violence has caused increased polarization; some people have migrated out of fear into neighbourhoods and enclaves according to common religious affiliation. And after a string of bombings in June, some retaliation violence was reported, suggesting the importance of peacebuilding in Kaduna at this critical point in time.

In a positive development, many Christians showed solidarity with Muslims in peacefully protesting an amateur anti-Islamic video in September.

Many inter-faith initiatives are working to promote peace in the state.

Lead Poisoning in Zamfara State

Formed in 1996, the Zamfara State is mainly populated by the Hausa and Fulani people. It is located in the northwest of Nigeria, bordering the Niger Republic to the north, Kaduna state to the south, Katsina state to the east, and Sokoto and Niger states to the west. Zamfara is comprised of 14 local governmental areas. UNLock incident reports come from 3 of these areas: the capital, Gusau; Anka; and Bukkuyum.

Reports from the Nigeria Watch dataset highlighted a number of incidences of violence such as two in which criminal gangs on motorbikes reportedly killed dozens of villagers in June and October.

Most of the UNLocK reports, however, did not deal with violence, but rather focused on the public health problem of lead poisoning as a result of unsafe artisanal gold mining practices. The problem was initially flagged in 2010 and since then, many children have died and thousands are still at risk of contamination. Environmental cleanups and preventive measures have yet to be completed in some vulnerable villages.
The problem with an overly simple analysis, which sees all violence in the North through a terrorist lens and all violence in the South through a militancy lens, is that the policies that emerge from such an analysis tend to be short-sighted and unsustainable, even if they do work to a degree. The Amnesty program in the Niger Delta is a case in point. It ended the militancy (at least for now) but did not begin to solve the problem of human insecurity.

Addressing the real problem will require a more holistic approach than the disarmament and demobilization process applied to address the problem of militancy. There must be a comprehensive strategy, geared at economic development and the empowerment of civil society to advocate for their interests and hold their leaders accountable. The underlying problem of corruption must be addressed. If these deeper issues are not addressed, the Amnesty program will not be a sustainable solution, even to the problem of militancy, let alone the broader problem of human insecurity. Cult groups are a labor pool at the disposal of any malignant entrepreneur with resources and a political, criminal, or militant agenda. Without getting rid of these structures and incentives, every election, dispute, or contest has the potential to escalate into an onset of violence.

Hopefully, the lessons (both of what worked and what did not) from the experience of the Amnesty program in the Niger Delta will be duly applied to the problem of insecurity in the North.

Platforms for the coordination of peacebuilding efforts of those across the public, private, and nongovernmental sectors should be created, encouraged, and used by all stakeholders at every level from interfaith initiatives in Kaduna to civil society networks and early warning systems in the Niger Delta, to public health initiatives in Zamfara, to water management in Adamawa.

If peacebuilding actors can find tools and mechanisms by which to work together, exchange information and best practices, and collectively advocate for the promotion of peaceable livelihoods and good governance, it is more likely that the solutions will be effective over the long term. Otherwise, violence will continue to ebb and flow with the election cycle and the drought, flaring up, with or without the participation of active, organized paramilitary organizations. It is not enough to monitor these paramilitary groups. The enabling environment that generates these corrosive structures must itself be changed.
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The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of initiatives focused on our central objective: to promote sustainable security and the ability of a state to solve its own problems peacefully without an external military or administrative presence. Our programs fall into three primary thematic areas:

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- Transnational Threats; and
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